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Abstract In recent years, a number of lightweight programs have been deployed in critical domains, such as in smart contracts based on 
blockchain technology. Therefore, the security and reliability of such programs should be guaranteed by the most credible technology. 
Higher-order logic theorem proving is one of the most reliable technologies for verifying the properties of programs. However, programs may be 
developed by different high level programming languages, and a general, extensible, and reusable formal memory (GERM) framework that can 
simultaneously support different formal verification specifications, particularly at the code level, is presently unavailable for verifying the 
properties of programs. Therefore, the present work proposes a GERM framework to fill this gap. The framework simulates physical memory 
hardware structure, including a low-level formal memory space, and provides a set of simple, nonintrusive application programming interfaces 
and assistant tools using Coq that can support different formal verification specifications simultaneously. The proposed GERM framework is 
independent and customizable, and was verified entirely in Coq. We also present an extension of Curry-Howard isomorphism, denoted as 
execution-verification isomorphism (EVI), which combines symbolic execution and theorem proving for increasing the degree of automation in 
higher-order logic theorem proving assistant tools. We also implement a toy intermediate programming language in a generalized algebraic 
datatypes style and a formal interpreter in Coq based on the GERM framework. These implementations are then employed to demonstrate the 
application of EVI to a simple code segment. This work is the first step in our project to build a general and powerful formal symbolic process 
virtual machine for certifying and verifying smart contracts operating on the blockchain platform easily and semi-automatically without 
consistency problems. 
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1. Introduction 
 In recent years, a number of lightweight programs have been deployed in critical domains, such as in smart contracts based on blockchain 
technology [1]. Therefore, verifying the security and reliability of such programs in the most rigorous manner available is crucial. Higher-order 
logic theorem proving is one of the most rigorous technologies for verifying the properties of programs. This involves establishing a formal 
model of a software system, and then verifying the system according to a mathematical proof of the formal model. In a standard approach, 
researchers can abstract a specific formal model for target software systems manually with the help of proof assistants [3]. This type of formal 
verification technology has many advantages. For example, it provides sufficient freedom and flexibility for designing formal models using 
higher-order logic theories, and can abstract and express very complex systems. However, numerous problems are encountered when applying 
theorem proving technology to program verification. For example, the abstraction and translation processes are completed manually. As such, the 
formal models obtained are dependent on the experience, knowledge, and proficiency of researchers. This invariably leads to a general lack of 
consistency between the formalization results obtained by different researchers. This lack of consistency is exacerbated by the fact that at present, 
verifiers employed in program verification cannot find a standard general formal state model to define intermediate states, which could be used 
to derive invariant models. Thus verifiers usually choose different algorithms to define the intermediate states in different situations. 
Unfortunately, the consistence among different state model is difficult to be guaranteed, even though they are used to prove identical theorems. 
Furthermore, different algorithms need different methods to derive, which is one of the main reasons obstructing the reusability and automation 
of theorem proving. Moreover, due to the lack of a unified state model, if the formal model is based on axiomatic semantics, such as Hoare logic 
[4] or separation logic [5], the modification of a single logical statement may force a large adjustment in the definition of states, or even force the 
rebuilding the formal model manually. These factors severely limit the universality of a conventionally derived formal model, and thereby 
severely limit its reusability. One of the most troubling problems associated with of this type of formal verification technology is that the 
consistency between the formal model and the original program cannot be ensured formally. As a result, the formal model runs the risk of 
misunderstanding the source program logic and implementation, and may import vulnerabilities not existing in the original program, or remove 
vulnerabilities existing in the source code as an unintended result of the abstraction and translation processes. Finally, the formalization 
workload involved is very heavy. For example, the complete verification of the seL4 operating system (OS) kernel [6] required a total of 11 
man-years, and the ratio of the original code of a complete, general-purpose concurrent OS kernel to the verification code of the CertiKOS [7] 
project was nearly 1:50. Although many higher-order theorem proving assistants provide a “tactic” mechanism [14] to help users design proving 
tactics to simplify programs evaluation process and construct proofs automatically, on amount of the differences among different formal models 
caused by above problems, it is hard to design tactics to verify formal models full-automatically. 
 One of the available solutions for addressing the above issues surrounding reusability, consistency, and automation is to design a formal 
symbolic process virtual machine (FSPVM) like KLEE [39], but developed in a higher-order theorem proving system, which can symbolically 
execute real world programs and verify their properties automatically using the execution result. However, if we want to implement it, we must 
overcome the following challenges. 
 The first challenge is developing an independent general formal memory model. It is the basis to construct a logic operating environment 
with the higher-order theorem proving system. It should be easily to support arbitrary high-level formal specifications to record their logic 
invariants and represent intermediate states during verification. It contributes to the reusability problem. Because it unifies the verification 
intermediate states and it can be used as the standard state model reused in different program verification models. 
 The second challenge is formalizing real world programming languages as an extensible intermediate programming language (IPL) and 
mechanizing IPL into the logic operating environment. The formal syntax and semantics of IPL should be equivalent with the respective real 
world target programming languages’. The IPL is for the reusability and consistency problems. Because, it standardizes the process of building a 
formal model for programs that the equivalent formal version programs written in IPL can be served as their formal models without abstracting 
or rebuilding. 
 The third challenge is developing a formal verified execution engine such as the formal interpreter based on the challenge 1 and 2. The 
execution engine should be able to automatically execute the formal version of programs written in IPL in the logic operating environment. And 
it is for the automation problem. 
 The fourth challenge is giving a theory for combining above symbolic execution elements and higher-order theorem proving to verify 
programs automatically, which contributes to reusability, consistency, and automation problems. 
 In this paper we have solved the challenge 1 and 4, and the present study makes the following contributions. 
 We design a general, extensible, and reusable formal memory (GERM) framework based on higher-order logic using Coq. It includes a 
formal memory space, and provides a set of simple and nonintrusive memory management APIs and a set of assistant tools. The GERM 
framework can express the interaction relationships between special and normal memory blocks. One the one hand, the framework 
functions independently of higher level specifications, so it can be used to represent intermediate states of any high-level specifications 
designated by general users, which facilitates the reuse of intermediate representations in different high-level formal verification models. 
On the other hand, the framework can be used as an operating environment to facilitate automated higher-order logic theorem proving. 
 We present a novel extension of Curry-Howard isomorphism (CHI), denoted herein as execution-verification isomorphism (EVI), which 
can combine theorem proving and symbolic execution technology in the operating environment of the GERM framework to facilitate 
automated higher-order logic theorem proving. The use of EVI makes it possible to execute a real world program logically while 
simultaneously verifying the properties of the program automatically in Coq or using another proof assistant that supports higher-order 
logic proving based on CHI without suffering inconsistency problems. 
 Finally, we illustrate the feasibility and advantages of the expected FSPVM based on the proposed GERM framework and EVI by 
implementing a toy IPL for IMP [25] and a formal interpreter in Coq based on the GERM framework and EVI to simulate the situation that 
the four challenges have been overcome, and apply them to verify the properties of a simple program segment written in IMP.  
 We employ Coq in this work because it is one of the most highly regarded and widely employed proof assistants [12]. The work in this 
paper is the first step of our ongoing project to build a general semi-automatic formal verification FSPVM for verifying smart contracts 
operating on the blockchain platform easily and reliably which will overcome the four challenges mentioned above. Our intention is to submit 
this as an open source project after completion of the core work. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the related work about studies on consistence, reusability and 
automation problems. Section 3 gives the basic notion and background of CHI. Section 4 introduces overall structure of the formal memory 
framework, and provides formal definitions of each of its components along with relevant proofs of their correct functionality. Section 5 
elaborates on the basic concept and advantages of EVI. Section 6 emphasizes the feasibility of the excepted FSPVM based on the proposed 
GERM framework and EVI by a simple instance. Finally, Section 7 presents preliminary conclusions and directions for future work. 
2. Related work 
 Program verification using higher-order logic theorem proving is a very important theoretical field in computer science. Many researchers 
try to solve the consistence, reusability and automation problems from different aspects and develop new tools to contribute to this field. For 
consistence and reusability problems, one of the pretty standard and efficient methods is to formalize real world programming languages as a 
IPL and design a formal memory model as the state model. Since the late 1960’s, a very large number of studies have focused on building 
memory models mathematically for program verification. Here, we present a brief discussion of the most significant studies that have inspired 
the present work. Norrish [33] and Hohmuth et al. [34] provided mechanized C/C++ semantics in HOL and PVS, respectively, which included 
low-level memory models. Tuch et al. [35] developed the first treatment of separation logic that unified the byte-level and logical views of 
memory in Isabelle/HOL. Appel and Blazy [32] later developed a mechanized separation logic for a C-based intermediate language in Coq. 
Manson et al. [29] developed a Java memory model. However, these works focus on specific domains and programming languages, and their 
formal memory models are deeply embedded in their framework, making them difficult to extend and modify for supporting different high-level 
specifications, which would enable the formalization of programs written by different high-level languages. Besides, most of them are individual 
researches for one or two problems on consistence, reusability or automation problems instead of considering them simultaneously. So they are 
hard to extend to solve these problems all. 
 In 2008, one of the milestones, CompCert project, appears which aims at compiler verification [16]. The team of CompCert formalizes an 
equivalent IPL called Clight for C language which is mechanized it in Coq. Besides, they develop a formal memory model for low-level 
imperative languages such as C and compiler intermediate languages. These works has served as the basis of some interesting and powerful 
program verification and analysis frameworks. Verified software toolchain (VST) [10] and deep specifications [11] are two representative 
projects which have been developed in conjunction with the IPL and formal memory model provided by CompCert. CertiKOS [7] is one of the 
most successful verification examples of them. In addition, seL4 [6] is another similar well-known project in recent years which is a fully 
verified microkernel that is considered to be the first OS kernel developed with an end-to-end proof of implementation correctness and security 
enforcement. However, these analysis frameworks suffer from the following main disadvantages. 
 First, they still focus on specific domains and programming languages. Besides, although formal memory model of CompCert can be 
extended to support different high-level specifications, it is still deeply embedded in its framework, which is hard work for general users to 
analyze and modify to support their own researches based on it. Moreover, the functionality of their formal memory models depends on the 
details of their toolchains. 
 Second, VST and deep specifications are very professional program verification tool chains and frameworks based on higher-order logic 
theorem proving for C programs. But they are unfriendly to general users. They have complex architectures, application programming 
interfaces (APIs) and tactics. These factors make the operations of these frameworks very difficult to be learned by general users. Besides, 
they are too heavyweight to be extended or modified by general users to solve special cases in their own researches.. 
 Third, the frameworks, such as deep specifications, need researchers to rebuild resource code of programs, and construct abstract layers 
manually. Even though, according to [11], verifiers should define specifications to prove the consistence between two relevant layers, the 
whole process is dependent on the experience of verifiers instead of a standard. Therefore, it still has the risk of consistence problem and it 
is impossible to become automatic using current automated theorem proving technologies. 
 Clearly, the first two disadvantages limit the ability of these analysis frameworks to handle special cases within their specific focus and 
severely restrict general users in the application of these frameworks, and the third disadvantage shows that current frameworks have not solved 
the consistence and automation problems completely. Finally, the formalization workload associated with these frameworks remains very heavy. 
 Compared with them, GERM provides almost the identical functionalities with CompCert, but its core design is much more lightweight, 
extensible and intuitive which can be easily implemented in Coq or similar proof assistants by a doctoral student who has the basic knowledge of 
the chosen proof assitant. Especially, GERM is not embedded in any other high-level frameworks. So it can generally server as the low-level 
formal memory model for arbitrary high-level program verification specifications. It also can serve as the basis of FSPVM which is our blueprint 
to solve the all three problems. Besides, we have implemented and verified GERM in Coq and extend it to support our ongoing project about 
formalizing Solidity [28] and the respective formal interpreter. 
 For automation problem, we note that symbolic execution is one of the best methods to improve the degree of automation. Unfortunately, 
none of the above frameworks employs it in them. Some powerful automatic theorem proving assistants have been developed based on it, such 
as satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) or SMT-based theorem proving assistants [8]. But they do not readily support higher-order logic, such 
that the expressibility and provability of formalizations is limited. SMTCoq [30] is an interesting project that tries to combine SMT and Coq. 
However, it is not sufficiently mature to finish complex programs verification missions. 
 Aiming at these problems, EVI can combine higher-order theorem proving and symbolic execution directly, standardize the modeling and 
verifying process and make it possible to design full-automatically tactics to verify different formal models. 
 We hope that, in the future, our works might be useful in other contexts such as static analyzers and program provers and their formal 
verification. 
3. The basic notion of CHI 
 In response to the work of H. B. Curry regarding programming language and proof theory, W. A. Howard privately circulated a manuscript 
in 1969, which was later formally published [22]. In this work, Howard pointed out that a correspondence exists between natural deduction and 
simply-typed lambda calculus, which established what is now denoted as CHI [23]. This work has served as the inspiration for many theorem 
proving assistants and functional programming languages (FPLs), such as Agda, Automath, Coq, Epigram, F#, F*, and Haskell, and is also a 
primary component forming the fundamental theory behind Cic. In brief, CHI proposes that a deep correspondence exists between the world of 
logic and the world of computation. This correspondence can be expressed according to three general principles. The first principle is given 
below. 
propositions as types (Principle 1) 
This principle describes an isomorphism between a given formal logic and a given programming language. At the surface, it says that, for each 
proposition in a formal logic, there is a corresponding type in an FPL, such as Coq (Gallina), and vice versa. The correspondence extends deeper, 
in that, for each proof of a given proposition, there is a program based on a lambda calculus of the corresponding type, and vice versa. This leads 
to the second principle given below. 
proofs as programs (Principle 2) 
Finally, the correspondence extends deeper still, in that each available means of simplifying a proof has a corresponding way of evaluating a 
program, and vice versa. This leads to the third principle given below. 
proofs as evaluation of programs (Principle 3) 
 This theory is the basis of GERM and EVI. It is also an important reason for us to employ Coq to achieve these works. 
4. Formal definition of the GERM framework 
 The GERM framework is designed and implemented based on the formal language denoted as Calculus of Inductive Construction (Cic) 
employed in Coq [15], which is well suited as a basis for high-level specifications in different formal models for program verification. For 
example, the use of Cic allows the GERM framework to be reused with different program verification formal models to store and generate 
intermediate states. In addition, this also serves as the basis of the EVI concept presented in Section 5. 
 The overall GERM framework structure is illustrated in Fig. 1. According to the figure, the GERM framework comprises two main 
components: a formal memory model in a trusted domain and assistant tools in a general domain. The formal memory model includes three 
levels from bottom to top: a formal memory space, low-level memory management operations, and basic memory management APIs. These 
levels are discussed in detail in Subsections 4.1.1–4.1.3, respectively. Assistant tools are employed in the GERM framework to obtain user 
requirements and generate dynamic specifications. Assistant tools are discussed in detail in Subsection 4.2. 
 Figure 1. Architecture of the GERM framework 
 The workflow of the GERM framework can be defined in conjunction with Fig. 1 as follows. A user first sets initial requirements, such as 
memory size, and then the assistant tools generate the respective specifications. Next, the entire formal memory model is certified according to 
the correctness properties employed in Coq. In the Coq specification, the judgments of the dynamic semantics are encoded as mutually inductive 
predicates, and the functions are written in Gallina, which is a non-Turing complete language without halting problem. If the formal memory 
model satisfies all required properties, then the specific GERM framework has been constructed successfully. The user can then build a 
high-level formal model based on the generated GERM framework. The complete workload for constructing the GERM framework with 100 
memory blocks is itemized in the Table 1. 
Table 1. Workload statistics for constructing the GERM framework with 100 memory blocks. 
 Objects Lines in C++ Lines in Coq 
Formal Memory Space 1 0 104 
Formal Memory Value 1 0 11 
Formal Memory Operations 122 0 2,289 
Assistant Tools 6 423 0 
Correctness Lemmas 23 0 531 
Total 153 3,358 
4.1 Formal memory model 
4.1.1 Formal memory space 
 This level simulates a real world physical memory structure, and consists of formal memory blocks used to store information, and the 
formal memory addresses used to index the respective memory blocks. Because of the formal memory space definition employed in the GERM 
framework, we can define special memory addresses to index special memory blocks isolated from the normal memory block.  
 A number of interesting algorithms can be employed to abstract a formal memory space, such as tree structure mapping [16] or graphic 
mapping [17]. These algorithms have both advantages and disadvantages. For example, they are able to represent an infinite memory space. 
However, their specifications and formal structures are very complex and difficult to extend. Moreover, for an operation to modify a memory 
block, it must search all nodes one by one rather than modifying the block directly through its memory address. These disadvantages can 
complicate the verification process, and correspondingly increase the workload of the proof assistant. 
 To avoid these disadvantages, and to simulate the physical memory space more intuitively in the higher order logic system of Coq, we 
define the formal memory space architecture by enumerating the memory blocks using Record type. In details, the abstract syntax of Record type 
defined in Coq reference manual [14] is given in Record Syntax 1 and 2.  
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑 ∶∶=  𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 [𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠] [: 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡] ∶=  [𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡] { [𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑0 ;  . . . ;  𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑛] }. (Record Syntax 1) 
Trusted Domain
High-level Formal Specifications / Implementation
call operations 
Normal Memory Address
Memory Address Label 
Low Level Operations
Basic Memory Management APIs
return      
Assistant Tools
Formal Memory Space
Auto-generating
Specifications
Special Operations
Special Memory Address
Permission Checker 
Formal Memory Model 
Untrusted Domain
Coq Proof Universe
Theorems
Correct
Specifications
Real World Software
generate model
verify
open
operate
operatecall
open
      
map
      
      
      
      
      
check call
build
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑠 ∶  𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∶=  𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐 { 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡0 [𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠0]: 𝑡𝑒𝑟 0;  . . . 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑛 [𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑛]: 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑛 } (Record Syntax 2) 
The square brackets “[ ]” means the term is optional. The identifier ident is the name of the defined record and sort is its type. The identifier 
𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐 is the name of its constructor. The binders 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠0 to 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑛 are the quantifiers (such as ∀ and ∃) which is optional. The 
identifiers 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡0 to 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑛 are the names of fields and for all 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠0, 𝑡𝑒𝑟 0 to for all 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑛, 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑛 their respective types. And it 
has some valuable features. First, according to the Record Syntax 2, each field must have an identifier. Second, in Coq, the identifiers are 
essentially abstract functions with type [𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖], 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖, and the field identifiers are satisfied the Axiom 1 to 3. 
 
Axiom 1 (Identifier Uniqueness): For all field identifiers in the same record type, suppose for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ℕ ∧  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, then 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ≠ 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗 holds. 
Axiom 2 (Bijection): As Relation 1, for all field identifiers are bound with a unique explicit field identifier and they satisfy the bijection function 
relationship. 
𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑏𝑖𝑗 𝑐 𝑖𝑜𝑛
↔      𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠 (Relation 1) 
Axiom 3 (Field Access): For all field identifiers are bound with a unique explicit field identifier and a field can only be accessed by its binding 
identifier. 
 
 These three axioms have already been built in the trusted core of Coq by Coq development team. The type-checking mechanism will check 
the definitions in the higher-order logic system of Coq are whether satisfied the Axiom 1 to 3. And it will give the error message if some 
definitions do not pass the type-checking test. Here is a simple example in Table 2. When we define a Record type example, if the definition exist 
duplicate field names, then Coq will give the error message. 
Table 2. An example of ill-formed definition of field identifiers checked by Coq. 
Coq < Record example: Type := new {a : A; a : B}. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Error: Objects have the same name 
 After redefining the Record type example in Table. 3 to satisfy the Axiom 1, we construct a specific Record term e with type example to 
store logic values 𝑣  and 𝑣𝑏 which have type A and B. The only way, provided in Coq, to access the field values stored in e is invoking the 
respective binding field identifiers. 
Table 3. An simple example of Record type about declaring, constructing and accessing. 
Coq < Record example: Type := new {a : A; b : B}. 
Coq < Definition e := new 𝑣  𝑣𝑏. 
Coq < Eval simpl in (e.(a)). 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
example is defined 
a is defined 
b is defined 
e is defined 
= 𝑣  : A 
 Based on these useful features of Record type, the expected lightweight and intuitively formal memory space can be abstracted as 
following contents. In Relation 2 and 3, the field identifiers are specified to represent the memory address and the binding fields represent the 
corresponding memory blocks. 
𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖
𝑟 𝑝𝑟   𝑛  
→        𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 (Relation 2) 
𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖
𝑟 𝑝𝑟   𝑛  
→        𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 (Relation 3) 
An example of this method for the specification of 16 memory blocks is illustrated in Fig. 2. The left side of Fig. 2 represents the formal 
specification of memory space in Coq, and the right side is the real world physical memory space structure. In the formal specification, the 
memory address denoted by address is the field identifier of record type memory, and each field can record a term denoted as value. According 
to the definition, it is clear that each formal memory block can be abstracted as a Cartesian product ⟨  𝑑𝑑𝑟 , 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 ⟩ ：𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, where 
the metavariable   𝑑𝑑𝑟 is an arbitrary memory address, and the metavariable  𝑣 𝑙𝑢  is the value term stored in   𝑑𝑑𝑟. Users not only can 
define normal memory addresses, but also can define addresses such as the address m_0xinit in Fig. 2 for special purposes, and, in this way, we 
can express isolation relationships between normal memory blocks and special memory blocks. 
Record memory : Type := new { 
  m_0xinit : value 
  m_0x00000000 : value 
  m_0x00000001 : value 
  m_0x00000002 : value 
  m_0x00000003 : value 
  … 
  m_0x0000000F: value 
} 
 
Figure 2. Formal memory space, including the formal specification of memory space in Coq (left), and the real world physical memory space 
structure (right). 
 Formal definitions of the memory syntax and proofs of the uniqueness, singlenesss, and isolation relationships of memory addresses are 
provided as follows based on an example abstract syntax given as BNF-MEM-ADDR below.  
Memory address:   𝑑𝑑𝑟::= special address | m_0x00000000 | … | m_0xFFFFFFFF (BNF-MEM-ADDR) 
 
Definition 1 (memory; memory state,       ): We use   𝑑𝑑𝑟
∗ to represent the set of memory addresses and  𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
∗ to represent the set of 
value terms, so the formal memory specification can be defined as the rule MEM-SPACE below, and its constructor is denoted as new. 
 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 ≡  𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑⟨  𝑑𝑑𝑟
∗,  𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
∗⟩ (MEM-SPACE) 
In addition, we denote a logical unit of memory transferred between different layers over the entire trusted domain as the memory state. Each 
memory state records the current verification information, which is generated automatically by symbolic execution and reasoning. We use the 
metavariable        to represent a memory state, and it is defined according to the rule MEM-STATE below. 
      : 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 (MEM-STATE) 
 
Theorem 1 (Uniqueness): We define a and a’ as two arbitrary formal memory address, and state that for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ℕ ∧  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ≠
𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗. 
Proof. According to the Relation 2 and 3, addresses are field identifiers of Record type and memory blocks are the binding fields. So addresses 
and memory blocks of this formal memory space model are satisfied the Axiom 1 to 3. And we can get the result that 
∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ℕ ∧  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 ≠ 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗, 
Hence an arbitrary formal memory block has a unique memory address and can only be accessed by its binding address. 
 
Theorem 2 (Singleness): We define t as an arbitrary formal memory block, and state that t can only have a single memory address. 
Proof. Similar to Theorem 1, we can get that addresses and memory blocks of this formal memory space model are satisfied the Axiom 1 to 3. 
Therefore, we can get the result that 
𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑏𝑖𝑗 𝑐 𝑖𝑜𝑛
↔      𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠. 
And we have proven that there not exist two equivalent addresses. Hence an arbitrary formal memory block t has a single memory address. 
 
Corollary 1 (Isolation): Again defining t as an arbitrary formal memory block, we state that t can only be accessed by its respective address. 
Proof. Based on Theorem 1 and 2, we can derive that t is both unique and singular. Hence it is obvious that t can only be accessed by its 
respective address. And Corollary 1 also can be proven by Axiom 3 directly. 
 
 According to the above discussion, value includes all memory information about a memory block, and memory is dependent on the 
specification of value. In the current memory model, meatavariable  𝑣 𝑙𝑢  represents an individual value term that consists of input data, data 
reflecting the respective environment, and the state of the respective memory block. Here, the data environment and state of the respective 
memory block are defined only abstractly in Definition 2 because they are dependent on the specific verification environment and requirements. 
 
 
m_0x00000000 value
m_0x00000001 value
m_0x00000002 value
m_0x00000003 value
… …
m_0x0000000F value
Memory Address Data Value
m_0xinit value
 Figure 3. Expandability of the data framework, including datatypes (data), e.g., integers (Int) and Boolean (Bool) values, data environmental 
factors (venv), e.g., the lexical scope (Lex) and lexical domains (Dom), and memory block state factors (binf), e.g., access authority (Acc) and 
occupation (Occ). 
 
Definition 2 (data environment; memory block state): The data environment variable Env is employed to formalize the context of respective 
value terms in the high-level programming language. In the current framework illustrated in Fig. 3, Env includes the lexical scope (Lex), lexical 
domains (Dom), type signatures, current context, inheritance, and super context. The variable 𝑣 𝑛𝑣 represents an individual Env term, as follows. 
𝑣 𝑛𝑣: 𝐸𝑛𝑣 (ENV-TERM) 
The memory block state variable Blc is employed to formalize the execution information of a memory block. In the current framework (Fig. 3), 
Blc includes the memory foot point, access authority (Acc), and occupation (Occ). The variable 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 represents an individual Blc term, as 
follows. 
𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓: 𝐵𝑙𝑐 (BLC-TERM) 
 
 Table 4. Basic datatypes employed in the formal memory space and their corresponding basic type inference rules of value constructors 
𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 : 
ℰ ⊢    ∶ 𝑢𝑛𝑖 
𝑈𝑛𝑑 𝑓∶ 𝑢𝑛𝑖 →𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝑣 𝑙𝑢  
𝑀,ℰ ⊢ 𝑈𝑛𝑑 𝑓    𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
 (VALUE-UNDEF) 
ℰ ⊢ 𝑜𝑖𝑛   ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 
     𝐼𝑛   ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 →𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
𝑀,ℰ ⊢ 𝐼𝑛  𝑜𝑖𝑛  𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
 (VALUE INT)  
ℰ ⊢ 𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙
 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙  ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙→𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
𝑀,ℰ ⊢𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙  𝑜𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
 (VALUE-BOOL) 
ℰ ⊢ 𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑜   ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑙𝑜  
𝐹𝑙𝑜   ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑙𝑜  →𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
𝑀,ℰ ⊢𝐹𝑙𝑜    𝑜𝑓𝑙𝑜   𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
 (VALUE-FLOAT) 
ℰ ⊢ 𝑜  𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛   𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔
 𝑆 𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔  ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛   𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔→𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
𝑀,ℰ ⊢𝑆 𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔   𝑜  𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
 (VALUE-STRING) 
𝛬 ⊢ 𝑖𝑛𝑖  𝑑𝑑𝑟 ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠        ∶ 𝜏     𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ 𝑣  ∶  𝑣 𝑙𝑢      ℰ ⊢ 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖𝑧  ∶  𝑛  
     𝐴𝑟𝑟 𝑦 ∶  𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→𝜏→𝑣 𝑙𝑢 →𝑛  →𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝑣 𝑙𝑢  
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢𝐴𝑟𝑟 𝑦  𝑖𝑛𝑖  𝑑𝑑𝑟  𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖𝑧      𝑣  𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
 (VALUE-ARR) 
𝛬 ⊢ 𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑟 ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠     𝑣𝑖𝑑 ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→ 𝑣 𝑟𝑖 𝑏𝑙 𝑖𝑑
𝑉𝑖𝑑 ∶ 𝑣 𝑟𝑖 𝑏𝑙 𝑖𝑑→𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝑣 𝑙𝑢  
𝑀,𝛬 ⊢𝑉𝑖𝑑  (𝑣𝑖𝑑 𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑟) 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
 (VALUE-PTR-VAR) 
 
𝛬 ⊢ 𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑟 ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠     𝑝𝑖𝑑 ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→ 𝑝 𝑟 𝑚   𝑟𝑖𝑑
𝑃𝑖𝑑 ∶ 𝑝 𝑟 𝑚   𝑟𝑖𝑑→𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝑣 𝑙𝑢  
𝑀,𝛬 ⊢𝑃𝑖𝑑  (𝑝𝑖𝑑 𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑟) 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
 (VALUE-PTR-PAR) 
𝛬 ⊢ 𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑟 ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠     𝑓𝑖𝑑 ∶  𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐 𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑑     𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ 𝑜𝑝 𝑟  ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑖   𝑣 𝑙𝑢 )
𝐹𝑖𝑑 ∶ 𝑝 𝑟 𝑚   𝑟𝑖𝑑→𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑖   𝑣 𝑙𝑢 )→𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢𝐹𝑖𝑑  (𝑓𝑖𝑑 𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑟)𝑜𝑝 𝑟  𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
 (VALUE-PTR-FUN) 
    ∶      𝑚 𝑛 
𝑆   ∶      𝑚 𝑛 →𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝑣 𝑙𝑢   
𝑀 ⊢𝑆        𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∶∶𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
 (VALUE-STT) 
𝛬 ⊢ 𝑛 𝑚  ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠     𝑚 𝑚𝑏 𝑟  ∶   𝑟𝑢𝑐 𝑚𝑒𝑚
𝑆 𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→  𝑟𝑢𝑐 𝑚𝑒𝑚→𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝑣 𝑙𝑢   
𝑀,𝛬 ⊢𝑆 𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑛 𝑚  𝑚 𝑚𝑏 𝑟  𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
 (VALUE-STR-Type) 
𝛬 ⊢  𝑑𝑑𝑟 ∶  𝑑𝑑𝑟        𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ 𝑜𝑣 𝑙𝑢   ∶ 𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑖   𝑣 𝑙𝑢 )
𝑆 𝑟 ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑖   𝑣 𝑙𝑢 )→𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝑣 𝑙𝑢   
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢𝑆 𝑟  𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑜𝑣 𝑙𝑢   𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
 (VALUE-STR) 
 
 In actual practice, programs are translated into machine code by a compiler, and the execution information is stored in physical memory 
using binary code. However, the GERM framework focuses on the verification of high-level programs rather than their execution of on actual 
hardware. In addition, the use of formal machine code will reduce the readability of formal specifications and proving theorems, and increase the 
verification workload. Therefore, standard program execution information is stored by value directly in formal memory rather than translating 
that information into formal specifications of binary code. As such, value can be formalized as a tuple 〈𝑑, 𝑣 𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓〉, where, as shown in Fig. 3, 
Int …
data
Bool Lex …
𝒗𝒆 𝒗
Dom Acc …
    
Occ
d represents input data (data) of various types such as integer (Int) and Boolean (Bool), which are presented in detail at the end of this subsection. 
Due to the above definition, d should be able to describe terms with different datatypes in the high-level programming language. In Cic, d, 𝑣 𝑛𝑣 
and 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 can be defined as inductive types, and different datatypes and memory properties are specified as different inductive type constructors 
of corresponding inductive types. In this way, the formal specifications of memory values are more readable, and can be transferred and 
extended easily by modifying the elements of the tuple, or by including additional inductive type constructors therein regarding data 
environment and/or memory block state freely. Furthermore, the use of this framework allows some common problems, such as memory 
overflow, to be found easily by type checking. Of course, if it becomes necessary to formalize the real world memory structure based on binary 
code, a user need only replace the current value definition with its corresponding binary definition. 
 According to the above discussion, we can formally define value in this framework according to Definition 3. 
 
Definition 3 (value;  𝑣 𝑙𝑢 ): In the formal memory model of the present framework, the information recorded in an arbitrary value term, 
denoted as metavariable  𝑣 𝑙𝑢 , includes the input data, and respective data environment and memory block state information, where the sets of 
each are given by 𝑑∗, 𝑣 𝑛𝑣
∗, and 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓
∗
, respectively. The formal specifications can be defined as the rule MEM-VALUE below. 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ≡ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ⟨𝑑∗, 𝑣 𝑛𝑣
∗, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓
∗⟩ (MEM-VALUE) 
 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 : 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (MEM-VALUE-TERM) 
 
 In current version of the proposed framework, value can record the 11 basic datatypes shown in Table. 4, including undefined (UNDEF), 
machine integer (INT), Boolean (BOOL), floating point (FLOAT) [18], string (STRING), array (ARR), pointers for variables (PTR-VAR), 
parameters (PTR-PAR), and functions (PTR-FUN) program statement (STT), and struct (with STR). As indicated by the table, most constructors 
are parameterized by the current memory information M, label address set Λ, and logic environment ℰ. We adopt the unit datatype to represent 
undefined, monad option data [19], which is the equivalent to the maybe datatype employed in Haskell [36]. The unit datatype describes the 
condition where a block is initialized but records no data value. In addition, the struct datatype has two inference rules, including 
VALUE-STR-Type, which is used to store the struct datatype declared by a programmer, and VALUE-STR, which is used to store the values of a 
variable declared by a struct datatype. In addition, the struct datatype inference rules include the label address variable 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   , which is a 
label of address that is presented in detail in the next subsection. 
4.1.2 Low-level memory management operations 
 This level analyzes requests for high-level memory management operations, and interacts with the formal memory space to generate the 
resulting memory state for those operation requests. Finally, the operation requests are then executed at this level. Specifically, the interactions 
on this level involve two parts. The first part is illustrated at the right of Fig. 1, and represents the low-level operations for normal memory 
blocks. This interaction provides a set of address labels and low-level operations for normal memory blocks. The label address set satisfies a 
bijection relationship with the set of normal memory addresses, and is provided to facilitate the indexing and operation of normal memory 
blocks through low-level operations for basic APIs and high-level specifications. This represents a formal memory management layer designed 
in Coq to facilitate the interactions between the formal memory space and low-level management operations. In this way, the formal memory 
space is isolated from high-level specifications, and the special memory blocks are transparent to high-level specifications, which provides for 
safer and more effective operations management. The second part is illustrated at the left of Fig. 1, and represents the low-level operations for 
special memory blocks. If a high-level specification request passes the permission checking process, then the special memory block is controlled 
directly by the special operation. 
 In detail, this layer first provides a label address with a value that is given by the enumeration type variable 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   . An example abstract 
syntax of 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    is defined as the rule BNF-LAB-ADDR below. 
𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   :  a::= _0x00000000 | … | _0xFFFFFFFF (BNF-LAB-ADDR) 
 
Figure 4. Mapping relationships of label address 
Normal Address
Label Address
Special Address
map
Special Block Normal Block
mapmap
Defining this kind of transitional type in Coq has two important benefits. First, as mentioned above, the field identifier (address) of a Record 
type actually represents a abstract function with type  𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 → 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 in Coq, which increases the degree of complexity of other high-level 
operation functions, and makes it more difficult to define and access a memory block. As such, the use of 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    and can simplify the 
high-level execution specification. Nevertheless, we will continue to use address to represent  𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 → 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 in the remainder of this paper 
for simplicity of presentation. Second, based on the rule BNF-LAB-ADDR above, users can define some special memory block, such as 
m_0xinit, which would be transparent to high-level specifications because, as shown in Fig. 4, label address is a subset of address, and only 
maps to a normal memory block, which can be directly modified by high-level specifications. In this way, the transparency of the special 
memory block isolates the low-level memory block from the high-level specifications. The formal definition of 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    is given in Definition 
4. 
 
Definition 4 (label address type; 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   ): In the low-level memory management layer, the label address type is a transitional type in Coq that 
is employed to provide a simple memory address identifier for operation functions, and to isolate the low-level formal memory space from 
high-level formal specifications. The value of the label address type is denoted as 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   , and the enumeration items of 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    are denoted 
by 𝑎∗. The type definition is given in rules LAB-ADDR and LAB-ADDR-TERM below. 
𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   ≡ 𝐸𝑛𝑢  𝑎
∗ (LAB-ADDR) 
Here, 𝑎 ∈ 𝑎∗: 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    and   𝑑𝑑𝑟 ∈   𝑑𝑑𝑟
∗: 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 can imply ℳ𝑎𝑝 𝑎∗ ⊆   𝑑𝑑𝑟
∗. 
𝑎: 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    (LAB-ADDR-TERM) 
 
 Based on Definition 4, we can implement the basic formal memory operations using the FPL Gallina [14] in Coq. The present version of 
the formal memory model employs 20 verified memory management operations, including 14 basic APIs, which are summarized in Table 5, and 
three low-level operations and three special operations that are summarized in Table 6. These operations are discussed in detail in the following 
subsection based on the following definition. 
 
Definition 5 (initial data, 𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑖 ; initial memory space,  𝑖𝑛𝑖 ): The present formal framework employs a convention that defines the initial data 
of a memory block (𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑖 ) as (𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓 𝑡𝑡 𝑣 𝑛𝑣 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓), and its corresponding initial value of        is defined as  𝑖𝑛𝑖 . 
 
Table 5. Basic memory management APIs employed in the formal memory model. 
Function Description Automatic 
ℳapL2m Map a to maddr Yes 
ℳapm2L Map maddr to a Yes 
ℳapL2nat Map a to ℕ Yes 
ℳapnat2L Map ℕ to a Yes 
readdir Read mvalue from a directly No 
readchck Read mvalue  from a after validation 
checking 
No 
writedir Write mvalue at a directly Yes 
writechck Write mvalue  at a after validation 
checking 
No 
addressoffset Offset address a to a′ No 
addresssrch Search a specified memory block  No 
emptysrch Search an empty memory block No 
allocate Allocate a memory block No 
freemem Free a specified memory block  No 
initmem Initialize the entire memory space Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Low level operations employed in the formal memory model, where the first 3 are normal operations and the final 3 are special 
operations. 
Function Description Automatic 
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤 Read  𝑣 𝑙𝑢  stored at   𝑑𝑑𝑟 directly No 
𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 Write  𝑣 𝑙𝑢  at   𝑑𝑑𝑟 directly Yes 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 Determine whether a memory block can 
be modified 
No 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑐 Determine whether two  𝑣 𝑙𝑢  entries 
are equal 
No 
𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 Determine whether a memory block can 
be allocated 
No 
𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑙 Set the entire memory space according 
to  𝑣 𝑙𝑢  
Yes 
4.1.3 Formal memory management APIs 
 This layer includes a set of simple, nonintrusive memory management APIs providing for implementing the high-level specifications 
designed by general users. The implementations of this layer are entirely independent from high-level specifications, and seamlessly implement 
the low-level memory management operations of the GERM framework, such that users need know nothing about these operations. Thus, any 
user who understands the basic grammar of Coq can modify or extend APIs easily according to specific requirements. Note that we use 
metavariable 𝜎 to represent current memory state in formal definition of the operations. These operations can be broadly classified as Map, 
Read, Write, Free, Allocate, Initialize, and Search. 
 Map: The first four functions ℳ𝑎𝑝𝐿2𝑚, ℳ𝑎𝑝𝑚2𝐿, ℳ𝑎𝑝𝐿2𝑛  , and ℳ𝑎𝑝𝑛  2𝐿 represent the basic mapping operations in this formal 
memory model. These functions convert terms among nature numbers (nat), 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   , and address. Because 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    is a subset of nat and 
address, these conversions represent a partial mapping between 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    and nat or address. To accommodate a condition of mapping failure, 
an option was added into ℳ𝑎𝑝𝑚2𝐿 and ℳ𝑎𝑝𝑛  2𝐿, where, if the return value is None, the function failed to map a term from 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    to nat 
or address, and the mapping was successful if the return value is Some a. The operational semantics of the Map operations are defined in Fig. 5. 
Here, we present only the lemma for the inversion property of the mapping functions. This is because the correctness of these functions is 
dependent on a specific definition of the mapping relation, which is abstract in this case, so that satisfying the inversion property means that 
every label address satisfying an arbitrary mapping relationship has a unique respective address and natural number, and vice versa. We can 
therefore assume under these conditions that the mapping operation in this model functions correctly. 
𝛬 ⊢  ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠        𝑀 ⊢ 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟∶  𝑑𝑑𝑟            
𝑚𝑎𝑝
→   𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟
ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑚∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→ 𝑑𝑑𝑟    
𝑀,𝛬 ⊢ ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑚( )↪ 𝑚𝑎
 (MAP-LM) 
𝛬 ⊢     𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠        ℰ ⊢ 𝑛∶ 𝑛           
𝑚𝑎𝑝
→   𝑛
ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑛𝑎𝑡∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→𝑛   
ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑛𝑎𝑡 ( ) ↪ 𝑛
 (MAP-LN) 
𝛬 ⊢  : ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠        𝑀 ⊢ 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟∶  𝑑𝑑𝑟            
𝑚𝑎𝑝
↔   𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟
ℳ 𝑝𝑚2𝐿∶  𝑑𝑑𝑟   →𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
𝑀,𝛬 ⊢ ℳ 𝑝𝑚2𝐿(𝑚𝑎)↪ 𝑆𝑜𝑚   
 (MAP-ML-T) 
𝛬 ⊢  : ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠        𝑀 ⊢ 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟∶  𝑑𝑑𝑟            ↚𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟
ℳ 𝑝𝑚2𝐿∶  𝑑𝑑𝑟   →𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
𝑀,𝛬 ⊢  ℳ 𝑝𝑚2𝐿(𝑚𝑎)↪ 𝑁𝑜𝑛 
 (MAP-ML-F) 
𝛬 ⊢  : ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠        ℰ ⊢ 𝑛∶ 𝑛            
𝑚𝑎𝑝
↔   𝑛
ℳ 𝑝𝑛𝑎𝑡2𝐿∶ 𝑛  →𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
 ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ℳ 𝑝𝑛𝑎𝑡2𝐿(𝑛)↪ 𝑆𝑜𝑚   
 (MAP-NL-T) 
𝛬 ⊢  ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠        ℰ ⊢ 𝑛∶ 𝑛            ↚𝑛
ℳ 𝑝𝑛𝑎𝑡2𝐿∶ 𝑛  →𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ℳ 𝑝𝑛𝑎𝑡2𝐿(𝑛)↪ 𝑁𝑜𝑛 
 (MAP-NL-F) 
Figure 5. Operational semantics of Map operations 
Lemma 1 (inversion): Suppose for all 𝑎 ∶  𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   , the conditions 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑎 = ℳ𝑎𝑝𝑚2𝐿(ℳ𝑎𝑝𝐿2𝑚(𝑎))  and 
𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑎 = ℳ𝑎𝑝𝑛  2𝐿(ℳ𝑎𝑝𝐿2𝑛  (𝑎)) hold. 
Proof. We split the conjunction as 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑎 = ℳ𝑎𝑝𝑚2𝐿(ℳ𝑎𝑝𝐿2𝑚(𝑎)) and 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑎 = ℳ𝑎𝑝𝑛  2𝐿(ℳ𝑎𝑝𝐿2𝑛  (𝑎)), and first prove the left part. 
1) Because label address is a subset of address by Definition 4, all 𝑎 ∶ 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    can map to a unique   ∶  𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 in any mapping relation 
(→). Hence, through the rule MAP-LM (Fig. 5), ℳ𝑎𝑝𝐿2𝑚(𝑎) can obtain a respective   . Obviously,    can also map to 𝑎 though a 
reverse mapping relation (←). Hence, through the rule MAP-ML-T (Fig. 5), ℳ𝑎𝑝𝑚2𝐿(  ) can obtain 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑎, which completes the proof for 
the left part. 2) The right part can be proven by the same process employed to prove the left part. Hence, the mapping operations satisfy the 
inversion property. 
 
 Read: The four read operation functions are 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤, 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑘, and 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘. The low-level read operation is 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤 , 
which is a special operation. This function is actually a redefinition of a Coq mechanism that has been introduced because each field identifier of 
Record type memory has the relation  𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 → 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, such that a term with Record type memory can access the value stored at a specified 
field by indexing the field identifier. For example, the construction m.(m_0x00000003) for a term m of type memory in Coq represents obtaining 
the value stored in the field indexed by the identifier m_0x00000003 directly. Because the fundamental theory of Coq is a type of higher-order 
typed lambda calculus. So this is encapsulated by the lambda abstraction, abbreviated as term 𝜆, as rule READ-LOW below. 
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤 ≡ (𝜆 : : 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦. ( 𝜆  𝑑𝑑𝑟: 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠. ( . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟)))) : 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (READ-LOW) 
In addition, 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟 employs the 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤 function and Map operations. The parameter of 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟 is a term of 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    type, and the term 
is translated into the parameter of 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤 by a Map operation. The function 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑘 is a general low-level operation that is used for 
determining whether a memory block can be modified, and is also used to define other basic operations. Here, we only provide an abstract 
definition because the operation of 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑘 is dependent on specific requirements and conditions. Specifically, for example, in the basic 
version of GERM, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑘 is employed to check access authority and type safety. However, when GERM is employed to support Ethereum 
verification, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑘 should add functions to check “gas” and “balance” [28] of smart contracts, such that its functionality is not generally 
verifiable. So we conclude it is correct. Finally, the function 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 is a combination of the above functions, and returns an option type value 
given by Some a if the operation is successful, and, otherwise, returns None. The operational semantics of the Read operations are defined in Fig. 
6. 
𝛬 ⊢   ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠       ℰ ⊢  𝑀.(ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑚( )) ↪ 𝑣
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ⟨𝜎,𝑟  𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑀,ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑚( ))⟩ ↪ ⟨𝜎
′,𝑣⟩  ∧ 𝜎≡𝜎′
𝑟  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟∶ 𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦→𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→𝑣 𝑙𝑢  
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢  ⊢⟨𝜎,𝑟  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟(𝜎, )⟩ ↪ ⟨𝜎
′,𝑣⟩
 (READ-DIR) 
𝛬 ⊢  : ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠       ℰ ⊢  𝑀.(ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑚( )) ↪ 𝑣
𝑀 ⊢ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘(𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓) ↪ 𝑓 𝑙  
𝑟  𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘∶ 𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦→𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣 𝑙𝑢  
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ⟨𝜎,𝑟  𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝜎,𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓, )⟩  ↪ ⟨𝜎
′,𝑓 𝑙  ,𝑁𝑜𝑛 ⟩  ∧ 𝜎≡𝜎′
 (READ-CHCK-FALSE) 
𝛬 ⊢     𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠        ℰ ⊢ 𝑀.(ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑚( ))  ↪  𝑣
𝑀 ⊢ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘(𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓) ↪  𝑟𝑢 
𝑟  𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘∶ 𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦→𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝐵𝑙𝑐→𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣 𝑙𝑢  
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ⟨𝜎,𝑟  𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝜎,𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓, )⟩ ↪ ⟨𝜎
′, 𝑟𝑢 ,𝑆𝑜𝑚 (𝑟  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟(𝜎
′, ))⟩  ∧ 𝜎≡𝜎′
 (READ-CHCK-TRUE) 
Figure 6. Operational semantics of Read operations 
Lemma 2 (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤  correctness): Suppose for all   : 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 and       : 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦, the equality 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤(      ,   ) =       . (  ) 
holds. 
Proof. The rule READ-LOW is a redefinition of the Coq mechanism M.(field_identifier) using lambda abstraction. When 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤  applies    
and  , according to lambda application rules of Cic, we can derive rule READ-App. 
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤(      ,   ) ≡ (𝜆 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦. (( 𝜆  𝑑𝑑𝑟: 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠. ( . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟)))  ))       (READ-App) 
Then we employ substitution rules of Cic to derive rule READ-Sub. 
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤(      ,   ) ≡ (𝜆 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦. (( 𝜆  𝑑𝑑𝑟: 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠. ( . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟))) [  𝑑𝑑𝑟 ≔   ])) [ ≔       ] (READ-Sub) 
Finally, we simplify rule Substitution can get 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤(      ,  ). Therefore, Lemma 2 is correct. 
 
Lemma 3 (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟 correctness): Suppose for all 𝑎: 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   ,   : 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠, and  : 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 that, if 𝑎 maps to   , then 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟( , 𝑎) =
 . (  ). 
Proof. By applying the rule READ-DIR (Fig. 6), we can replace 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟( , 𝑎) with 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤( ,ℳ𝑎𝑝𝐿2𝑚(𝑎)) (1). Lemmas 1 and 2 prove 
that ℳ𝑎𝑝𝐿2𝑚(𝑎) ⇒    (2)  and 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤( ,  ) =  . (  ) (3) . Therefore, substituting (2) into (1) yields 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤( ,  ) , which, 
according to (3), verifies that 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟( , 𝑎) =  . (  ) is true. 
 
Lemma 4 (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 correctness): Suppose for all 𝑎: 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   ,  : 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦, 𝑣 𝑛𝑣: : 𝐸𝑛𝑣, and 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓: 𝐵𝑙𝑐 that, if𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑘(𝑣 𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓)  ⇒
 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒, then 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘( , 𝑣 𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓, 𝑎) = 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒; else, 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘( , 𝑣 𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 , 𝑎) = 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 ( . (  )). 
Proof. When 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑘(𝑣 𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓) returns true, we can apply rule READ-CHCK-TRUE (Fig. 6) to replace 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘( , 𝑣 𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓, 𝑎) with 
𝑆𝑜 𝑒(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟(𝑀
′, 𝑎)) (1). Lemma 3 proves that 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟( , 𝑎) =  . (  ) (2). Therefore, substituting (2) into (1) yields 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 ( . (  )). 
Hence, 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘( , 𝑣 𝑛𝑣 , 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 , 𝑎) = 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 ( . (  ))  is true. Otherwise, we can apply rule READ-CHCK-FALSE (Fig. 6) to replace 
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘( , 𝑣 𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓, 𝑎) with None. Hence, 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘( , 𝑣 𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓, 𝑎) = 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 is true. 
 
 Write: These operations include the special operation 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤, and the two basic APIs 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 and 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘. Actually, 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 
represent a set of low-level operations that are defined using a Coq mechanism. In Coq, a new term of a Record type can only be constructed 
using its respective constructor. For example, to write a value v into a memory block indexed by m_0x00000003, we must use the constructor 
new defined in Definition 1 to generate a new memory state       = (𝑛𝑒𝑤 ( . ( 0)… . ( 2) 𝑣 … ). According to lambda calculus 
abstraction, we present this mechanism as a set of low-level operations 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖  (𝑖 ∈ ℕ), which are defined by the rule WRITE-LOW below. 
In addition, the rule MAP-RE below represents the mapping of a memory address to its corresponding 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖  which is satisfied bijection 
relationship, and 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 taking   𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖 as parameter to employ the respective 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖 . 
𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖 ≡ (𝜆 𝑣: 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒. ( 𝜆 : 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦. (𝑛𝑒𝑤 ( . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟0)… . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖−1) [𝑣/ . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖)]  … )))) : 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 
(WRITE-LOW) 
  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖
𝑏𝑖𝑗 𝑐 𝑖𝑜𝑛
↔      𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖  (MAP-RE) 
The function 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 employs 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤. The parameter of 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 is a term of type 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟    that is translated into the parameter of 
𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 by a Map operation. Finally, the function 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 is a combination of the above functions and 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑘. If 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑘 returns 
a false option,        will not be changed; otherwise, it will generate a new       
′ . The operational semantics of the Write operations are 
defined in Fig. 7. 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢  ,   ′:: 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠       𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ 𝑣: ∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢         
′∈ ̅ ∧  ′≠ 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ⟨𝜎,𝑤𝑟𝑖  𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝜎,ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑚( ),𝑣)⟩ ↪ ⟨𝜎
′,𝜎′⟩ 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ 𝑟  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟(𝜎
′, )≡𝑣 ∧ 𝑟  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟(𝜎
′, ′)≡𝑟  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟(𝜎, 
′)
𝑤𝑟𝑖  𝑑𝑖𝑟∶ 𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦→𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→𝑣 𝑙𝑢 →𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ⟨𝜎,𝑤𝑟𝑖  𝑑𝑖𝑟(𝜎, ,𝑣)⟩  ↪ ⟨𝜎
′,𝜎′⟩
 (WRITE-DIR) 
𝛬 ⊢  : ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠       𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ 𝑣∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘(𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓) ↪ 𝑓 𝑙  
𝑤𝑟𝑖  𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘∶ 𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦→𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓→𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→𝑣 𝑙𝑢 →𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ⟨𝜎,𝑤𝑟𝑖  𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝜎,𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓, ,𝑣)⟩  ↪ ⟨𝜎
′,𝑓 𝑙  ,𝜎′⟩ ∧ 𝜎≡𝜎′  
 (WRITE-CHCK-FALSE) 
𝛬 ⊢  : ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠       𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ 𝑣: ∶ 𝑣 𝑙𝑢 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓) ↪  𝑟𝑢 
𝑤𝑟𝑖  𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘∶ 𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦→𝐸𝑛𝑣→𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓→𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→𝑣 𝑙𝑢 →𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ⟨𝜎,𝑤𝑟𝑖  𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝜎,𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓, ,𝑣)⟩  ↪ ⟨𝜎
′, 𝑟𝑢 ,𝑤𝑟𝑖  𝑑𝑖𝑟(𝜎
′, ,𝑣)⟩ ∧ 𝜎≡𝜎′ 
 (WRITE-CHCK-TRUE) 
Figure 7. Operational semantics of Write operations 
Lemma 5 (𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 correctness): Suppose for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈  ℕ ∧ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,   𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖 ,   𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑗 ∶ 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠,       ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦, and 𝑣𝑛 𝑤 ∶ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 that the 
conjunction (𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤(      ,  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖 , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤)) . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖) = 𝑣𝑛 𝑤  ∧ (𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤(      ,  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖 , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤)) . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑗) =       . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑗) holds. 
Proof. First, we destruct this conjunction into two sub-goals that (𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤(      ,  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖 , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤)) . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖)  (1) and 
(𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤(      ,  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖 , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤)) . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑗) =       . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑗) (2). For (1), According to the rule MAP-RE, 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤(      ,  , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤) 
can be replaced by 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖(      , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤) . Then, according to Cic application rules and the rule WRITE-LOW above, 
𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖(      , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤) is replaced by rule WRITE-App. 
𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖(      , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤) ≡ (𝜆 𝑣: 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒. (( 𝜆 :  𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦. (𝑛𝑒𝑤 ( . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟0)… [𝑣/ . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖)]  … )))      ))𝑣𝑛 𝑤 
(WRITE-App) 
Then we employ substitution rules of Cic to derive rule WRITE-Sub. 
𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖(      , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤) ≡ (𝜆 𝑣: 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒. (( 𝜆 : 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦. (𝑛𝑒𝑤 ( . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟0)… [𝑣/ . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖)] … ))) [ ≔       ])) [𝑣 ≔ 𝑣𝑛 𝑤] 
(WRITE-Sub) 
Finally, we can simplify WRITE-Sub as WRITE-Sub’ which is a new memory state. 
𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖(      , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤) ≡ 𝑛𝑒𝑤 (      . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟0)… [𝑣𝑛 𝑤/ . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖)] … ) (WRITE-Sub’) 
Therefore, (𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤(      ,  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖 , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤)) . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖) ≡ 𝑛𝑒𝑤 (      . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟0)… [𝑣𝑛 𝑤/ . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖)] … ). (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖) = 𝑣𝑛 𝑤. Hence, (1) 
is correct. For (2), according to WRITE-Sub’, it is obvious that for all  𝑗 ∈  ℕ ∧ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, (𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤(      ,   𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖 , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤)) . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑗) ≡
𝑛𝑒𝑤 (      . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟0)… [𝑣𝑛 𝑤/ . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖)] … ). (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑗) =       . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑗). Therefore, (2) is also correct. Thus, Lemma 5 is proven. 
 
Lemma 6 (𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟  correctness): Suppose for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈  ℕ ∧ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 , 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗 ∶ 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   ,       ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 , and 𝑣𝑛 𝑤 ∶ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  that the 
conjunction (𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟(      , 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤)). (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖) = 𝑣𝑛 𝑤  ∧ (𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟(      , 𝑎𝑗 , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤)) . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑗) =       . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑗) holds. 
Proof. By applying the rule WRITE-DIR in Fig. 7 and MAP-LM in Fig. 5, we can replace this conjunction with 
(𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤(      ,  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖 , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤)) . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖) = 𝑣𝑛 𝑤  ∧ (𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤(      ,  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑖 , 𝑣𝑛 𝑤)) . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑗) =       . (  𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑗). Then, we can apply 
Lemma 5 to prove it directly. 
 
Lemma 7 (𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 correctness): Suppose for all 𝑎 ∶  𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   ,  ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦, 𝑣 𝑛𝑣 : ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣, and 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐 that, if 𝑎 maps to    and 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑐𝑘(𝑣 𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓)  ↪  𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒, then 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘( , 𝑣 𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓 , 𝑎, 𝑣) =  ; else, 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘( , 𝑣 𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓, 𝑎, 𝑣) = 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟( , 𝑎, 𝑣). 
Proof. By applying the rules WRITE-CHCK-FALSE and WRITE-CHCK-TRUE (Fig. 7), we can replace 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 with   or 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟, and 
prove the equalities directly. 
𝛬 ⊢     𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠        𝑀 ⊢ 𝑚𝑎∶  𝑑𝑑𝑟           ℰ ⊢ 𝑜𝑓𝑓   ∶ 𝑛  
𝑓𝑜𝑓𝑓∶ 𝑛  →𝑛  →𝑛  
 𝑑𝑑𝑟   𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→(𝑛  →𝑛  →𝑛  )→𝑛  →𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢  𝑑𝑑𝑟   𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡( ,𝑓𝑜𝑓𝑓,𝑜𝑓𝑓   ) ↪ ℳ 𝑝𝑛𝑎𝑡2𝐿(𝑓𝑜𝑓𝑓(ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑛𝑎𝑡( ),𝑜𝑓𝑓   ))
 (ADDR-OFF) 
𝐴 ∶ 𝑇𝑦𝑝         𝛬 ⊢  𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝑓𝑖𝑙  𝑟∶ 𝐴→𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙       𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖 𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∶ 𝐴 
𝑓𝑖𝑙  𝑟(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖 𝑖𝑜𝑛)  𝑟𝑢 
 𝑑𝑑𝑟   𝑠𝑟𝑐ℎ ∶ 𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦→𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→(𝐴→𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙)→𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ⟨𝜎, 𝑑𝑑𝑟   𝑠𝑟𝑐ℎ(𝜎, 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑓𝑖𝑙  𝑟)⟩↪ ⟨𝜎
′
,𝑆𝑜𝑚 ( 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡)⟩∧ 𝜎≡𝜎
′
 (ADDR-SER-T) 
𝐴∶ 𝑇𝑦𝑝         𝛬 ⊢  𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝑓𝑖𝑙  𝑟∶ 𝐴→𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙       𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖 𝑖𝑜𝑛∶ 𝐴
𝑓𝑖𝑙  𝑟(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖 𝑖𝑜𝑛) ↪ 𝑟𝑢 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑛𝑎𝑡( 𝑑𝑑𝑟   𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡(ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑛𝑎𝑡( 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡),𝑝𝑙𝑢 ,1)) ↪𝑆𝑜𝑚   𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡
 𝑑𝑑𝑟   𝑠𝑟𝑐ℎ∶ 𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦→𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→(𝐴→𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙)→𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ⟨𝜎, 𝑑𝑑𝑟   𝑠𝑟𝑐ℎ(𝜎, 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑓𝑖𝑙  𝑟)⟩ ↪ ⟨𝜎
′
, 𝑑𝑑𝑟   𝑠𝑟𝑐ℎ(𝜎
′, 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝑓𝑖𝑙  𝑟)⟩ ∧ 𝜎≡𝜎
′
 (ADDR-SER-NE) 
𝐴∶ 𝑇𝑦𝑝         𝛬 ⊢  𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝑓𝑖𝑙  𝑟∶ 𝐴→𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙       𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖 𝑖𝑜𝑛∶ 𝐴
𝑓𝑖𝑙  𝑟(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖 𝑖𝑜𝑛) ↪𝑓 𝑙  
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑛𝑎𝑡( 𝑑𝑑𝑟   𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡(ℳ 𝑝𝐿2𝑛𝑎𝑡( 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡),𝑝𝑙𝑢 ,1)) ↪𝑁𝑜𝑛 
 𝑑𝑑𝑟   𝑠𝑟𝑐ℎ∶𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦→𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→(𝐴→𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙)→𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ⟨𝜎, 𝑚𝑝 𝑦𝑠𝑟𝑐ℎ(𝜎, 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡)⟩ ↪ ⟨𝜎
′
,𝑁𝑜𝑛 ⟩ ∧ 𝜎≡𝜎′
 (ADDR-SER-NO) 
Figure 8. Operational semantics of Search operations 
 Search: These are also essential basic operations that include functions 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓   , 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑐ℎ, 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑐, and 𝑒 𝑝𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑐ℎ. The 
function 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓    is applied for shifting a current label address to another label address according to a specified offset. It is defined as a 
higher-order function that takes a basic label address, a offset function and an arbitrary offset as parameters to accommodate different offset 
conditions. We should note that 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓    is not always successful. Because according to memory definition, memory space has a fixed 
size, the result returned by 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓    may over the range of address which is invalid. In order to deal this problem, we employ ℳ𝑎𝑝𝑛  2𝐿 
to check the return value of offset function, and 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓    returns an option type value given by Some label address, if ℳ𝑎𝑝𝑛  2𝐿 is 
successful, and, otherwise, returns None. The function 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑐ℎ is employed in conjunction with 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓    to search a specified 
memory block that satisfies a filter condition. The function 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑐 returns a binary sum datatype [20] defined by the rule VAL-DEC below. 
This rule can be proven easily in Coq using the decide equality tactic [14]. 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑐 ∶ (∀ 𝑣0 𝑣1 : ∶ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, {𝑣0 = 𝑣1} + {𝑣0 ≠ 𝑣1}) (VAL-DEC) 
Finally, 𝑒 𝑝𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑐ℎ is a special case of 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑐ℎ, where the filter is specified as 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑐(𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑖 ) ∷ (∀ 𝑣1, {𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 𝑣1} + {𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑖 ≠ 𝑣1}). 
The correctness of 𝑒 𝑝𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑐ℎ is confirmed according to the correctness of 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑐 discussed above and the correctness of 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑐ℎ 
presented by Lemma 9 below. The operational semantics of the Search operations are defined in Fig. 8. 
 
Lemma 8 (𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓    correctness): Suppose for all   ∶  𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠,  ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦, 𝑣 ∶  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, 𝑛 ∶  𝑛𝑎𝑡, and 𝑓𝑜𝑓𝑓 ∶  𝑛𝑎𝑡 → 𝑛𝑎𝑡 → 𝑛𝑎𝑡 
that the equality ℳ𝑎𝑝𝑛  2𝐿(𝑓𝑜𝑓𝑓(ℳ𝑎𝑝𝐿2𝑛  (𝑎), 𝑛)) = 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓   (𝑎, 𝑓𝑜𝑓𝑓 , 𝑛) holds. 
Proof. The correctness of ℳ𝑎𝑝𝑛  2𝐿 and ℳ𝑎𝑝𝐿2𝑛   have been proven by Lemma 1, so that Lemma 8 can be proven directly by applying the 
rule ADDR-OFF (Fig. 8). 
 
Lemma 9 (𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑐ℎ correctness): Suppose for all {𝐴 ∶ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒}, 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟 ∶ 𝐴 → 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∶ 𝐴, 𝑎 ∶ 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   , and  ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 that, if 
𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  ↪ 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 , then 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑐ℎ( , 𝑎, 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟) = 𝑆𝑜 𝑒(𝑎𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟 𝑛 )  (1); else, if 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  ↪ 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒  and the next 
address produced by 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓    fails, then 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑐ℎ( , 𝑎, 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟) = 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒  (2); else, search the next indexed memory block 
recursively (3). 
Proof. Based on Lemmas 1 and 8, cases (1), (2), and (3) above can be proven by applying rules (Fig. 8) ADDR-SER-T, ADDR-SER-NE, and 
ADDR-SER-NO, respectively. 
 
 Allocate: These operations are basic and essential APIs denoted by the functions 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘. The low-level operation 
𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 is used to determine whether the information of the current memory block, including various factors such as authority and occupation, 
satisfies the condition for allocation. Here, we only provide an abstract definition of 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 because its operation is dependent on specific 
requirements and conditions, such that its functionality is not generally verifiable. The function 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒 is a special case of 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑐ℎ, 
where the filter of 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑐ℎ is specified using 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘. Assuming the correctness of 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘, in conjunction with the correctness of 
𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑐ℎ proven in Lemma 9, we can conclude that the functionality of 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒 is also correct. The operational semantics of the Allocate 
operation are defined in Fig. 9. 
𝛬 ⊢     𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠        𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢  𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝑟  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟(𝜎, )) ↪𝑓 𝑙  
 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐    ∶  𝑑𝑑𝑟   →𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦→𝑜𝑝 𝑖𝑜𝑛  
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ⟨𝜎, 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐   ( ,𝜎)⟩ ↪ ⟨𝜎′, 𝑑𝑑𝑟   𝑠𝑟𝑐ℎ(𝜎, , 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘)⟩ ∧ 𝜎≡𝜎
′ (ALLOC) 
Figure 9. Operational semantics of Allocate operations 
 Free: This operation is represented by the function 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚 𝑚, which is a special case of 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟, where the input value v is specified as 
𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑖 . Because the correctness of 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 has been proven in Lemma 6., the functionality of 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚 𝑚 is obviously correct. The operational 
semantics of the Free operation are defined in Fig. 10. 
𝛬 ⊢   ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝑓𝑟  𝑚𝑒𝑚∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠→𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦→𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ⟨𝜎,𝑓𝑟  𝑚𝑒𝑚( ,𝜎)⟩ ↪ ⟨𝜎
′,𝑤𝑟𝑖  𝑑𝑖𝑟(𝜎
′, ,𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡)⟩ ∧ 𝜎≡𝜎
′ (FREE) 
Figure 10. Operational semantics of Free operations 
 Initialize: These operations are employed to initialize the formal memory space prior to executing the verification process. These 
operations include the functions 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑙 and 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑚 𝑚, where 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑙 is a special operation that implements a special case of 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖 . The 
function of 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑙 is to call all 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖  and modify the entire memory block using the value v. The correctness of every 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖  has been 
proven in Lemma 5, so the functionality of 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑙 is obviously correct. The function 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑚 𝑚 is a special case of 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑙, where v is specified 
as 𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑖 . Thus, its functionality is also assured of being correct. The operational semantics of the Initialize operations are defined in Fig. 11. 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢    𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝜎,𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡) ↪ 𝜎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝑚𝑒𝑚∶ 𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦→𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 
𝑀,ℰ,𝛬 ⊢ ⟨𝜎,𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝑚𝑒𝑚(𝜎)⟩ ⇒ ⟨𝜎
′,𝜎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡⟩ ∧ 𝜎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡≡𝜎
′ (INIT) 
Figure 11. Operational semantics of Initialize operations 
4.2 Assistant tools 
 According to Definition 1, the formal memory space and its respective addresses are defined by the Record type. This type is represented 
rigorously in the formal Cic language, and is a special inductive datatype with only a single constructor of type Sort [14]. This ensures that it is 
impossible to modify a Record type dynamically in Coq after it has been defined, which is analogous to the impossibility of dynamically 
changing the size of physical fixed-size memory hardware. Therefore, operations that depend on a specific memory address, such as Map and 
Write operations, also cannot modify memory space after it has been defined. This places considerable importance on the definition of formal 
memory spaces. However, defining a specific formal memory space by manually enumerating memory blocks and corresponding operations one 
by one can be an exceedingly tedious activity. Fortunately, Because of the enumeration process, the definitions of discussed formal memory 
space and related operations have fixed rules. For example, when we enumerate a new address in memory such as m_0x00000003, we should 
add _0x00000003 into 𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑟   . Then we need to update the mapping relationships and related operations mentioned above. The enumeration 
process of adding new addresses in memory is identical and the relevant operations are similar to each other. Therefore, these can be easily 
generated recursively by a simple program written in a high-level programming language such as Java or C++. This automatic definition of a 
memory space according to specific requirements is the basis of assistant tools. The formal definition of assistant tools is given below as the rule 
ASSIST-TOOL. 
𝛤,ℛ ⊢  𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑟 ↪ 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑦𝑖 𝑙𝑑 
→    . 𝑣 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 (ASSIST-TOOL). 
Here, assistant tools function within a verification context 𝛤 with requirements ℛ , and employ a specific user requirement 𝑟 ∷ ℛ as 
parameters, which include special memory blocks and the size of normal memory blocks. Assistant tools then generate the respective formal 
specifications and export them as .v files that can be loaded in Coq directly. These formal specifications are denoted as dynamic specifications, 
and are based on Definitions 1 and 4. In addition, assistant tools employ those operations listed in Tables 2 and 3 that are given as automatic. The 
results in .v files generated by assistant tools are written using Gallina syntax, which can be executed and verified in Coq directly. According to 
the proofs given in the previous subsection, the results of assistant tools can be assumed to include no ill-formed definitions and to satisfy all 
specifications as long as the results pass the Coq type-checking mechanism. Finally, although these assistant tools are implemented in the general 
domain using general-purpose programming languages, the relation between the assistant tools and the respective results satisfies the 
non-aftereffect property, as illustrated in Fig. 12 [21]. As such, the verified results are not influenced by the assistant tools implementation. 
 
Figure 12. Workflow of assistant tools illustrating the non-aftereffect property 
4.3 Comparing with the formal memory model of CompCert 
 Hereto, GERM framework is constructed completely. In order to further explain the value of GERM, we compare GERM with memory 
model of CompCert (MMoCC). Because CompCert is one of most successful project about program verification and it has been used in many 
other projects about higher-order theorem proving. Furthermore, MMoCC is also implemented in Coq. 
Table 7. The comparison about basic features between the memory model of CompCert and GERM. 
Features MMoCC GERM 
Size Dynamic and infinite Static and finite 
Weight Heayweight Lightweight 
Basic operations alloc, free, load, store alloc, free, read, write, initialize 
Verification Verified Verified 
Range of application Low-level imperative languages Generic 
Pointer arithmetic Support Support 
Embedment Embedded Non-embedded 
 
 We compare them from the features of size, weight, basic operations, verification, range of application, pointer arithmetic and embedment. 
As illustrated in Table. 7, most of the features of MMoCC and GERM are identical. The differences between them are size, weight, range of 
application and embedment. The size of MMoCC is infinite, compared with finite size of GERM. But as mentioned in subsection 4, we have 
implemented the assistant tools to remedy this limitation, and the assistant tools of GERM can generate sufficient size automatically. Because 
MMoCC is specialized to support formal specifications of low-level imperative languages and compiler intermediate languages rather than 
aiming to supporting arbitrary specifications as GERM, MMoCC is embedded in CompCert framework rather than being independent as GERM. 
Finally, the weight of GERM is more lightweight than MMoCC. These features not only make GERM have almost identical functionalities with 
MMoCC, but make it friendlier to general users than MMoCC. As mentioned above sections, general users can redefine or extend GERM to 
support their own researches using basic knowledge of Coq. So GERM has huge potential and range of application in program verification field. 
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5. EVI 
 The concept of EVI is proposed herein to increase the degree to which the process of program verification is conducted automatically by 
combining higher-order logic theorem proving and symbolic execution. EVI includes three key components: a general formal memory model, a 
general-purpose IPL, and a respective formal interpreter. A general formal memory model such as GERM supports a basic formal system for 
constructing a logic-based operating environment corresponding to the real world operating environment of hardware, and serves as the basis for 
the general-purpose IPL and respective formal interpreter, which are used to model, execute, and verify programs automatically.  
5.1 Conceptual basis of EVI 
 The deep correspondences make CHI very useful for unifying formal proofs and program computation. However, most mainstream 
general-purpose programming languages (GPLs) employed in the real world are not designed based on lambda calculus and cannot be analyzed 
in the higher-order logic environment. The programs written using these languages are very difficult or even impossible to verify directly and 
automatically using CHI. This forms the basis for the present development of EVI. To avoid ambiguity in the following discussion of EVI, we 
use program to represent programs that are written in an FPL based on CHI, and RWprogram to represent real world programs that are written in 
a GPL. In addition, we redefine metavariable ℰ to represent higher-order logic environment which supports CHI. 
 
Figure 13. Formalization of a general-purpose programming language to obtain a intermediate programming language 
 
Figure 14. Equivalence between real world program (RWprogram) execution and execution in a logic environment 
 For the present development of EVI, we first note that, due to the equivalence between lambda calculus and Turing machine formalisms 
[24], logic theories based on lambda calculus are sufficiently powerful to formalize and mechanize the syntax and semantics of any GPL from 
beginning to end into ℰ with the help of FPLs provided by ℰ, and thereby to obtain the corresponding IPL which can be analyzed in ℰ directly, 
as illustrated in Fig. 13. Actually, there exist many related works, such as [40], to discuss how to build an IPL for a specific GPL. Because of the 
equivalent syntax and semantics, IPL is equivalent with GPL, so it can be implied that the formal RWprogram (FRWprogram) rewritten by IPL is 
also equivalent with RWprogram as Relation 4. In this way, when a FRWprogram is analyzed in ℰ is equivalent that RWprogram is analyzed in 
ℰ. 
𝐺𝑃𝐿 ≡ 𝐼𝑃𝐿 ⊃ 𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ≡ 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎  (Relation 4) 
 However, if we want to verify a FRWprogram using CHI, it should be executable in ℰ. In real world, an RWprogram is executed with the 
help of corresponding interpreters or compilers in a physical operating environment. Compared with physical operating environment, the 
combination of a formal general memory model such as GERM and its ℰ have already virtualized a minimal higher-order logic operating 
environment. Therefore, although an FRWprogram cannot execute directly in ℰ, such as Coq, we can implement a formal interpreter 
(FInterpreter) using FPLs based on the higher-order logic operating environment that follows the formal syntax and semantics of the 
corresponding IPL to simulate the execution process of RWprogram in real world and interpret the RWprogram so that it can be symbolically 
executed in ℰ direcly with the same process as is conducted in the real world. This process is illustrated in Fig. 14. Besides, the formal 
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interpreter is developed using FPLs. Thus, the formal interpreter is a program with the following abstract definition: 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟: 𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦 → 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑦. 
It means the formal interpreter takes a formal memory state defined by the general formal memory model and a FRWprogram as parameters and 
follows the formal semantics of IPL to execute (same as evaluating) FRWprogram and yields a new formal memory state. Accordingly, we can 
conclude that the execution of a formal FRWprogram in the formal interpreter corresponds to an evaluation of a program. And according to the 
Relation 4, we can also imply that it is equivalent with the symbolic execution of a formal RWprogram. Therefore, through Principles 2 and 3, 
we can derive Corollary 1 as follows. 
proofs as evaluation of programs as execution of programs (Corollary 1) 
 While the above discussion demonstrates the isomorphism of RWprogram execution and proofs, we note that the process of proving 
propositions in present ℰs is to construct equivalent propositions as its proofs [23]. According to Principle 1 to 3, it is isomorphic to constructing 
terms with excepted types by evaluating programs. Because of Corollary 1, we can also imply that it is also isomorphic to constructing terms 
with excepted types by executing programs. Obviously, the proofs cannot guarantee the correctness of properties excepted in RWprogram, such 
as functional correctness or security properties. For example, as illustrated in Fig. 15, the excepted correct memory state is  1, but the final 
memory state evaluated by formal interpreter is  2. Here we assume FInterpreter is correct (Because FInterpreter is a program developed 
using FPLs and can be directly verified its properties in ℰ.), so we can intuitively conclude that FRWprogram is not satisfied expected properties 
or functions, and it exists errors. But  1 and  2 both can be used as the proofs of memory type and the proofs cannot find out that 
FRWprogram exists errors. 
 
Figure 15. Example of useless proofs 
 
Figure 16. Isomorphism between verification and RWprogram execution 
 To solve this problem, we should strengthen the propositions according to the functional correctness requirements and security 
requirements of actual RWprograms. The axiomatic semantic, Hoare logic, is the method we choose to strengthen propositions. Because it is one 
of the strictest program verification methods in theorem proving technology and it is a method that can assist EVI to automatically verify 
RWprogram which will be explained later. Therefore, as rule Hoare-Inference, the following simplified axiomatic semantic definition is adopted 
in EVI. We take  𝑖𝑛𝑖  and 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎  as preconditions and the  𝑓𝑖𝑛 𝑙 , which is satisfied expected properties, as postconditions. So the 
predicate 𝐹𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 ( 𝑖𝑛𝑖 , 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) =  𝑓𝑖𝑛 𝑙  is the new stronger type / proposition needs to be verified. Obviously, only when 
the executing result of 𝐹𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 ( 𝑖𝑛𝑖 , 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) is  𝑓𝑖𝑛 𝑙, the proposition can be proved. 
 𝑃{ 𝑖𝑛𝑖 } 𝐹𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 ( 𝑖𝑛𝑖 , 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) 𝑄{ 𝑓𝑖𝑛 𝑙} (Hoare-Inference) 
As such, the stronger propositions are the relevant properties of RWprograms, and the respective proofs are the verifications. Accordingly, we 
obtain Corollary 2 and Corollary 3 below. 
properties as propositions as types (Corollary 2) 
verifications as proofs (Corollary 3) 
 Based on Corollaries 1, 2, and 3, we can deduce that the symbolic execution of an RWprogram in a formal system based on CHI is 
equivalent to constructing the respective proof terms of verification propositions, and vice versa. This is illustrated in Fig. 16. Thus, 
correspondences can be made still deeper yet to obtain a fourth principle below. 
verifications as execution of programs (Principle 4) 
 Hereto, we have proven that EVI combines formal verification of higher-order theorem proving and symbolic execution technology. 
5.2 Advantages of EVI 
 In this subsection, we summarize the advantages of the proposed EVI. 
 First of all, the proposed EVI, taking Hoare logic to strengthen propositions, deals the automatic verification problems of Hoare logic 
mentioned in Section 1. Specifically, if we want to use Hoare logic or similar style to automatically verify programs, we need to solve three 
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problems: unifying the set of logic conditions, inferring intermediate logic conditions automatically, and proving loops. For solutions of the first 
and second problems, we take forward direction inference of Hoare logic as an example to illustrate them. Here is a very simple code segment 
and its verification using Hoare logic shown as below. 
“x ∶= 1;  y ∶= x; ”
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣 
→   “{T}x ∶= 1; {x = 1}y ∶= x; {x = 1 ∧ y = 1}” 
But if we add a new statement “ z ∶= x + y; ”, the verification process needs to be adjusted as following. 
“x ∶= 1;  y ∶= 2;  z ∶= x + y; ”
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣 
→   “{T}x ∶= 1; {x = 1}y ∶= 2; {x = 1 ∧ y = 2 ∧ x + y = 3}z ∶= x + y; {x = 1 ∧ y = 2 ∧ z = 3}”  
This process can be abstracted as the process I, where we take ?̅? and ?̅? to represent the set of logic conditions of variables. It is obvious that if 
some logic statements 𝑐𝑖 are modified, the relevant sets of logic conditions ?̅? all need to be adjusted, including the number and definition of 
elements stored in ?̅?. This chain reaction makes the manual verification workload involved become very heavy, and the discrete and 
non-uniform storage mode of ?̅? makes the automatic inferences become difficult and inefficient. 
𝑃{?̅?}𝑐0
𝑖𝑛𝑓 𝑟
→   𝑄0{𝑞0
0 …𝑞𝑗
0}𝑐1
𝑖𝑛𝑓 𝑟
→   𝑄1{𝑞0
1…𝑞𝑘
1}𝑐2 ↠ 𝑐𝑛𝑄𝑛{𝑞0
𝑛 …𝑞𝑚
𝑛 }
?
↔𝑄{?̅?𝑓𝑖𝑛 𝑙}, (𝑗 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ m) (I) 
Actually, ?̅? and ?̅? is a type of indirect method to simulate the formal memory space. As rule II, with the help of GERM and EVI, ?̅? and ?̅? 
are encapsulated as the formal memory state m that stores all variables information into their allocated memory blocks, and the intermediate 
memory states can be rebuilt by formal interpreter automatically instead of deriving manually. 
 Note that, as mentioned in subsection 5.1, we do not limit the range of formal semantics, because the distinctions among the operational 
semantics, denotational semantics and axiom semantics can be vague in the process of symbolic execution (verification). In ℰ, no matter what 
types of formal semantics chosen as the basis of the formal interpreter, they all can equivalently define the logic behaviors of IPL mathematically. 
The formal interpreter follows the semantics of IPL to generate logic abstract expressions for formal memory state, which can be used as the 
logic conditions in the Hoare style inferences. 
𝑃{ 𝑖𝑛𝑖 }𝑐0
𝐹𝐼𝑛  𝑟𝑝𝑟   𝑟(𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡,𝑐0)
→                 𝑄0{ 0}𝑐1
𝐹𝐼𝑛  𝑟𝑝𝑟   𝑟(𝑚0,𝑐1)
→               𝑄1{ 1}𝑐2 ↠ 𝑐𝑛𝑄𝑛{ 𝑛}
?
↔𝑄{ 𝑓𝑖𝑛 𝑙} (II) 
 For proving loops problem, due to the combination of symbolic execution and higher-order theorem proving, we can use Bounded Model 
Checking (BMC) [26] and finding loop invariants simultaneously. At first, we employ BMC notion to set a limitation into the formal interpreter 
that the formal interpreter only can execute K times. In a general sense, if the execution of the FRWprogram can generate the corresponding final 
memory state using L times (𝐿 ≤ 𝐾), it means the loops exist in the FRWprogram can be unfolded as a set of identical normal sequence 
statements directly in finite times which can be inferred by rule II. Then, if the execution of the FRWprogram invokes into a loop and cannot 
finish the loop after K times executing, we can set the loop statement as a break point, and separate the FRWprogram as two parts, head and tail. 
Next we need to find out the loop invariants and encapsulated them as invariant memory state 𝐼{ 𝑖}, which plays the roles of the final memory 
state of the head part and the initial memory state of the tail part, as illustrated in process III. 
𝑃{ 𝑖𝑛𝑖 }𝑐0 ↠ 𝑐𝑖𝐼{ 𝑖} (ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑) and 𝑐𝑖𝐼{ 𝑖} ↠ 𝑐𝑛𝑄{ 𝑓𝑖𝑛 𝑙} (𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙) (III) 
And by employing composition rule of Hoare logic, we can get 𝑃{ 𝑖𝑛𝑖 }𝑐0 ↠ 𝑐𝑛𝑄{ 𝑓𝑖𝑛 𝑙}. 
 Hence, through GERM and EVI, as rule Hoare-Inference, although, the modification of logical statements will cause the changes of 
intermediate logic conditions, the definition of states does not need to be adjusted, and the new intermediate logic conditions stored in the each 
state can be inferred automatically. And therefore we can take Hoare logic to strengthen propositions and automatically verify FRWprograms. 
 Besides, EVI also can solve the consistence, reusability and automation problems. 
 First, for consistence problems, according to Principle 4, the execution of FRWprograms written in IPL is isomorphic to their formal 
verifications. Therefore, obviously, FRWprograms play the role of the formal models of corresponding RWprograms. According to 
Relation 4, 𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ≡ 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 , so the formal model is equivalent with target RWprograms without consistent problems. 
Besides, because 𝐺𝑃𝐿 ≡ 𝐼𝑃𝐿, the modeling process is standardized as equivalently translating RWprograms into FRWprograms line by 
line mechanically without rebuilding, abstracting or any other steps which need to depend on the experience, knowledge, and proficiency 
of researchers. So it is also impossible to introduce consistence problems during constructing formal models. Furthermore, this mechanical 
translation process can be finished by specific translators automatically and reduce the workload caused by building formal models which 
also contributes to the automation problem. 
 Second, for reusability problems, as rule Hoare-Inference, if we want to verify same theorems for different programs, instead of rebuilding 
the whole formal models, we only need to replace the  𝑖𝑛𝑖  and 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 , vice versa, if we want to verify different theorems for 
same programs, we only need to replace the  𝑓𝑖𝑛 𝑙 . Besides the  𝑖𝑛𝑖 , which have been verified, can directly be used in other 
verifications as  𝑖𝑛𝑖 . 
 Finally, for automation problems, it should be considered from two aspects. In theory, as mentioned above, the formal verification can be 
finished automatically by symbolically executing FRWprograms in ℰ. In practice, the program verification process of all formal models 
based on EVI has been unified as the process of evaluating 𝐹𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 ( 𝑖𝑛𝑖 , 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ) and proving the equivalence between 
the result memory state and excepted final memory state. Thus the differences of program verification processes among different formal 
models have been reduced. Therefore it becomes possible to design subtactics based on the “tactic” mechanism provided by proof 
assistants which can finish different parts of the verification process, and combine them to become a large tactic which can finish the 
verification process fully automatically by employing the combination of tactics. In Table. 8, we illustrate the comparison of automation of 
building formal models, defining formal properties and verifying among VST, deep specifications framework and EVI. 
 
Table 8. The comparison of automation about building formal models, defining properties and verifying among VST, deep specification 
framework and EVI. 
 VST Deep Specification framework EVI 
Modeling Fully-automatic Manually Fully-Automatic 
Defining Property Manually Manually Manually 
Verifying Semi-automatic Manually to Semi-automatic Semi-automatic to Fully-automatic 
6. Advanced application of the GERM framework and EVI 
 In this section, we implement a toy FSPVM to emphasize the feasibility of our blueprint about the FSPVM based on GERM and EVI and 
concretely show the advantages mentioned above. For simulating the situation that four challenges have been overcome, we choose a simple 
imperative programming IMP [25], embodying a tiny core fragment of conventional mainstream languages such as C and Java, as the target GPL 
which has been used as an example language in many classical text books about programming language theory, and present the design of its IPL 
and the implementation of a corresponding formal interpreter in Coq based on the proposed formal memory model. Then we discuss their use for 
verifying security properties in Coq based on Principle 4.  
6.1 Toy IPL 
 The abstract syntax of IMP is given in Table. 9, which only has basic arithmetic and Boolean datatypes. As a first step, we build a formal 
toy IPL based on IMP [25]. It is formally structured into types, values, expressions with variables, and statements, and its formal syntax and 
semantics are defined as strong type using generalized algebraic datatypes (GADTs) [2]. In this way, we give types of syntax constructors 
directly and it is impossible to construct ill-typed terms and stuck during evaluation in the type system of Coq. And the formal static and 
dynamic semantics are more easily to be defined and understood. A brief introduction to its formal abstract syntax is given in the following 
subsection. 
Table 9. Abstract syntax of IMP. 
Type:  𝜏: : = nat | bool 
Value:  𝑎: : = ℕ 
   𝑏: : = true | false 
Expression: 𝑒: : = a | b | 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 | 𝑒1 − 𝑒2 | 𝑒1 == 𝑒2 | 𝑒1||𝑒2 | 𝑒1&&𝑒2 | id 
statement:  𝑠: : = 𝑠1 ;;  𝑠2 | if 𝑒 then 𝑠1 else 𝑠2 | 𝑒1 = 𝑒2 | skip | throw 
6.1.1 Formal abstract syntax 
 Type: This corresponds in IMP to the type signature incorporated in the data environment variable Env of the formal memory model, as 
described in Definition 2, and is employed in IMP to classify language values and expressions. Because IMP has only arithmetic and Boolean 
datatype values and variable expressions, the only types defined are Tint, Tbool, and Tvid. And these types are used as the type signatures to 
define the GADTs of 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐼𝑀𝑃 and 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝐼𝑀𝑃. Their definitions in Coq are shown in Fig. 17. 
 Figure 17. Type definitions of IMP in Coq 
 Value: This corresponds in the value of IMP to value in the formal memory model. In IMP, this term is formally defined as a GADT 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐼𝑀𝑃: (∀ 𝑡: 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒, 𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑡), where it is parameterized by the type signature. According to Table. 9, the values of IMP include nature number 
and Boolean value, so 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐼𝑀𝑃 constructed by constructor Vnat and Vbool. Its formal definition in Coq is shown in Fig. 18. 
 
Figure 18. Value definitions of IMP in Coq 
 Expression: Formal syntax of IMP expressions are also defined using GADTs as 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝐼𝑀𝑃: (∀ 𝑡0 𝑡1: 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟  0  1). The 𝜏0 refers to the 
expression current type and the 𝜏1 refers to the type after evaluation. For instance, there is Boolean variable expression e, so the type of e is 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑇𝑣𝑖𝑑 (𝑜 )  𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 . In this way, the formal syntax of expressions becomes more clear and abstract, and can keep the type safety of the IPL of 
IMP expressions strictly. In addition, it specifies and limits the semantics of each expression constructor employed for each of the three kinds of 
expressions given in Table. 9 representing constant, variable, and binary operation expressions, respectively. Their formal abstract syntax in Coq 
is defined in Fig. 19. 
  
Figure 19. Expression definitions of IMP in Coq 
 Statement: In IMP, this includes conditional, assignment, sequence, skip, and throw statements. Specially, throw is a type of statement that 
will halt the execution of the entire program, which is often defined in a JavaScript-like programming language such as Solidity. Besides, 
Benefiting from GADTs definition, formal statements of IMP are all well-formed. For example, informal syntax of IMP may occur 
if (“error”) 𝑠0 𝑠1. 
Although, these syntax errors will be found out during compiling, if we want to evaluate in higher-order theorem proving assistants, they may be 
stuck or figure out wrong result. But because of the type signatures, the type of condition has been limited as ∀ 𝑡0: 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟  0 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 in formal 
abstract syntax tree. And it is impossible to construct ill-formed statements like the above one. Their formal abstract syntax in Coq is defined in 
Fig. 20. 
  
Figure 20. Statement definitions of IMP in Coq 
Inductive type : Type := 
  | Tnat 
  | Tbool 
  | Tvid : option address →type. 
Inductive val : type → Type := 
  | Vnat : nat → val Tint 
  | Vbool : bool → val Tbool. 
Inductive bop : type → type → Type := 
  | feqbOfNat : bopTnat Tbool 
  | fplusOfNat : bopTnat Tnat 
  | fsubOfNat : bopTnat Tnat 
  | forbOfBool : bopTbool Tbool 
  | fandbOfBool : bopTbool Tbool. 
Inductive expr : type → type → Type:= 
  | Econst : forall t, val t → exprt t 
  | Evar : forall addr t, expr(Tvid addr) t 
  | Ebop : forall t0 t1 t2 t2
′ , bopt2  t2′ 
           exprt0 t2 → exprt1 t2 → exprt2′  t2′. 
Inductive statement : Type := 
  | If : forall t, exprt Tbool → statement 
        → statement → statement 
  | Assignv : forall t  t0 t1, 
        exprt t1 → exprt0 t1 → statement 
  | Seq : statement → statement → statement 
  | Snil : statement 
  | Throw : statement. 
6.2 Toy formal interpreter 
 As a second step, we formalize the semantics of IMP and implement the formal interpreter in Coq, which can follow the formal semantics 
to interact with the GERM framework and evaluate a FRWprogram written in the IPL of IMP to its final memory state. This formal interpreter is 
very simple, and its correctness can be verified in Coq easily. Therefore, we do not evaluate the correctness of the interpreter here. A brief 
introduction to the formal semantics and respective formal interpreter functions are given in the following subsection. 
6.2.1 Formal semantics 
 Evaluation of value: The semantics of value evaluation are transforming the values of IPL to the values of memory. According to Value 
syntax, the semantics can be defined easily as Fig. 21. 
 
Figure 21. Implementation of evaluation of value in Coq 
 The formal semantics of expressions are defined separately as expression for left value and expression for right value [40], which is used to 
distinguish the typical mode of value or expression evaluation on the left and right hand side of an assignment statement. 
 Evaluation of expression for left value: This kind of expression semantics is used to evaluate the expressions at the left side of assignment 
statements. In IMP, only variable expressions can serve as the left value of assignment statements, thus the evaluation process is very simple, 
where, if the current expression is a variable expression, then the indexed label address is returned; else, an error result is returned. The 
implementation in Coq is shown in Fig. 22.  
 
Figure 22. Implementation of evaluation of expression left value in Coq 
 Evaluation of expression for right value: For an expression evaluated as a right value, all kinds of IMP expressions can serve as the right 
value of assignment statements. A constant expression will be evaluated according to the semantics of Evaluation of value, where the variable 
expression will access the respective memory block using 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘, and a binary operation expression will be evaluated by assistant functions 
extended in Coq according to the value of the bop type given in Fig. 19. The implementation in Coq is shown in Fig. 23. 
 
Figure 23. Implementation of evaluation of expression right value in Coq 
 Evaluation of statement: This is the entry point of the formal interpreter. It takes as parameters a memory state  𝑖𝑛𝑖 , current environment 
information 𝑣 𝑛𝑣, current block information 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟, and the FRWprogram to be executed. Then, it evaluates program into a final memory state 
 𝑓𝑖𝑛 𝑙 . The implementation in Coq is shown in Fig. 24. 
Definition val_to_value venv binfor t (v : val t) : option value := 
 match v with 
  | Vnat n ⇒ Some (Nat (Some n) venv binfor) 
  | Vbool b ⇒ Some (Bool (Some b) venv binfor) 
 end. 
Fixpoint expr_l t0 t1 (e : exprt0 t1) : option address := 
 match e with 
  | Evar oaddr t1 ⇒ oaddr 
  | _ ⇒ None 
 end. 
Fixpoint expr_r t0 t1 m venv binfor (e : exprt0 t1) : option value := 
 match e with 
  | Econst v ⇒ (val_to_value m venv v) 
  | Evar oaddr t1 ⇒ 
    match oaddr with 
     | None ⇒ None | Some addr ⇒ (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 m venv binfor addr) 
    end 
  | Ebop b e0 e1 ⇒ 
    match b with 
     | feqbOfNat ⇒ eqb_val (expr_r m venv binfor e0) (expr_r m venv binfor e1) 
     | fplusOfNat ⇒ plus_val (expr_r m venv binfor e0) (expr_r m venv binfor e1) 
     | fsubOfNat ⇒ sub_val (expr_r m venv binfor e0) (expr_r m venv binfor e1) 
     | forbOfBool ⇒ orb_val (expr_r m venv binfor e0) (expr_r m venv binfore1) 
     | fandbOfBool ⇒ andb_val (expr_r m venv binfor e0) (expr_r m venv binfor e1) 
 end end. 
 Figure 24. Implementation of evaluation of statement in Coq 
6.3 Case study: automation and verification 
  Based on above preparation work, we have constructed a toy FSPVM for IMP. We can use it to verify programs written in IMP. Here we 
give a simple example code in the left of Fig. 26. The requirement of it is that, if Pledge is zero or complete or refunded is true, then the throw 
statement is executed; else, the variable refnd is assigned as true. In practice, the process of verification based on EVI involves three steps: 1) 
defining a formal model; 2) defining properties (including setting initial and final memory space); 3) verifying (executing). For step 1, the 
process of modeling can be finished completely automatically by assistant tools such translator. And the result is given in the right of Fig. 26. 
Step 2 needs to be completed manually according to the requirements of code. Automating this process is a difficult problem that remains 
unsolved in nearly all existing theorem proving and model checking assistant applications. Specifically, first, we need to initialize the variables 
in conditional statement in  𝑖𝑛𝑖 , and set the postcondition that if the condition is true, then the value of refnd stored in  𝑓𝑖𝑛 𝑙  should be true, 
else  𝑖𝑛𝑖 ≡  𝑓𝑖𝑛 𝑙 . Finally, step 3 is almost fully automatically that is illustrated by the example given in Fig. 25. Here, the cases of abstract 
values are classified by the destruct procedure, and then the step procedure, which is designed through the “tactic” mechanism of Coq, is applied 
to complete the verification automatically. The verification process based on EVI is conducted as an evaluation by the interpreter, and the 
process is fixed. Therefore, the step procedure can contain all of the inference rules of the evaluation process. As such, the step procedure is like 
a switch launching the interpreter to symbolically execute any formal FRWprogram, and then generating the proof terms of the respective 
properties automatically. The only one manual substep in step 3 is classifying the cases of abstract values by the destruct procedure. However, 
we should note that this substep has a fixed rule that only abstract values defined in  𝑖𝑛𝑖  are needed to be processed. So this substep is able to 
be solved automatically, and we are going to deal it. Moreover, we can set a break point manually to observe logic invariants stored in 
intermediate memory states, as shown in Fig. 27. 
Fixpoint test K m venv binfor (stt : statement) : memory := 
match K with 
 | O ⇒ m | S K’ ⇒  
 match m.(m_throw) with 
  | true ⇒ init_m | false ⇒ 
    match stt with 
     | Snil ⇒ m | Throw ⇒ (writedir m _0xthrow true) 
     | Seq s0 s1 ⇒ let m’ := test K’ m venv binfor s0 in 
                        test K’ m’ venv binfor s1 
     | If e s0 s1 ⇒  
       match expr_r venv binfor e with 
        | None ⇒ None | Some v ⇒  
          match v with 
           | Bool b _ _ ⇒ 
             match b with 
              | Some true ⇒ test K’ m venv binfor s0 
              | Some false ⇒ test K’ m venv binfor s1 
              | None ⇒ m 
             end 
           | _ ⇒ m 
          end end 
    | Assignv e0 e1 ⇒  
      match expr_r venv binfore1 with 
       | None ⇒ m 
       | Some v ⇒ match expr_l venv binfor e0 with 
                    | None ⇒ m | Some addr ⇒ writechck m venv binfor addr v 
                   end  
 end end end end. 
 
Figure 25. Example of the verification step (step 3) 
 
 
Figure 26. Simple RWprogram code segment (right) and corresponding formal program (left) 
 According to above simple example, we illustrate feasibility to build a FSPVM and verify programs in practice based on GERM and EVI. 
Actually, we have employed GERM and EVI into our ongoing project for Ethereum smart contract verification and the Fig. 28 shows an 
example of it. Although it is much more complex than the above example given in Fig. 17 to 27, it is clear that they have identical verification 
process, which also ensures the feasibility of the FPSVM blueprint. And these relevant works about our project will be introduced in our other 
papers when they are completed. 
 
Figure 27. Formal memory state during verify 
 
Figure 28. An verification example of the ongoing project about building a FSPVM for Ethereum smart contracts using GERM and EVI 
Theorem _pledge_correct : forall b1 b2 n m0 m1  m2 venv binfor, 
m0 = 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 minit (Bool (Some b1) venv binfor) _complete → 
m1 = 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 m0 (Bool (Some b2) venv binfor) _refunded → 
m2 = 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 m1 (Nat (Some n) venv binfor) _Pledge →  
((z = 0 ∨ b1 = true ∨ b2 = true) 
∧ test K m2 venv binfor _pledge_test = minit) ∨  
((z ≠ 0 ∧ b1 = false ∧ b2 = false) 
∧ 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟 (test K m2 venv binfor _pledge_test) _refnd = (Bool (Some true) venv binfor)) 
Proof. 
 destruct venv, binfor; intros; initmem. 
 rewrite H1. 
 destruct n, b1, b2; step. 
Qed. 
if (Pledge == 0 || 
  complete || 
  refunded ) { 
   throw; } 
refnd = true; 
Definition _pledge_test := 
   Seq (If ((Evar (Some _Pledge) Tnat) 
         (==) (Econst (Vnat 0)) 
         (||) (Evar (Some _complete) Tbool) 
         (||) (Evar (Some _refunded) Tbool)) 
         (Throw) (Snil)) 
  (Seq (Assignv (Evar (Some _refnd) Tbool) 
                (Econst (Vbool true))) 
  Snil). 
7. Conclusions and future work 
7.1 Conclusion 
 In this paper, we developed a general, extensible, and reusable formal memory (GERM) framework based on the calculus of inductive 
constructions, and implemented and verified the framework in Coq. This independent and customizable framework is employed to simulate the 
structure and operations of physical memory hardware, and provides a basis for users to easily construct formal models of programs written in 
any high-level language for program verification. We also presented an extension of Curry-Howard isomorphism, denoted as 
execution-verification isomorphism (EVI), which combines symbolic execution and theorem proving for solving the problems of automation of 
verification in higher-order logic theorem proving assistant tools, and. Finally, we define a toy FSPVM, including a toy language and a 
respective formal interpreter in Coq based on the GERM framework and EVI notion, and verify a simple code segment in order to demonstrate 
the feasibility and advantages of the blueprint of our expected FSPVM. 
7.2 Future work 
 We are presently pursuing the formalization of higher-level smart contract development languages, including Serpent [27] and Solidity 
[28]. We will then develop a formal verified interpreter for these languages based on the GERM framework. Finally, we will build a general 
formal verification toolchain for blockchain smart contracts based on EVI with the goal of developing automatic smart contract verification. 
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